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THE LEGAL STATUS OF FAMILIES
AS INSTITUTIONS
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese t
Historically, our legal tradition has seen a fundamental contra-
diction between the family and the individual, or, to put it differ-
ently, has preferred to treat the family as a corporate unit rather
than as a collection of isolated individuals. This preference ac-
counted for Blackstone's assertion,
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended dur-
ing the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs every thing.... Upon this principle, of an union of per-
son in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, du-
ties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.'
By the same token, the children born into a family were expected to
fall under the authority of its head. The family, in other words, was
taken to constitute a unit with a legal personality that transcended
and subsumed the individual rights of its constituent members.
The subordination of individual rights within the family was
never complete. Husbands were not legally represented as owning
their wives or their children-although they were known to sell one
or the other. In principle, our tradition insisted upon a difference
between family members and slaves, although early advocates of wo-
men's rights were wont to emphasize the similarity, arguing that
married women, effectively, should be viewed as slaves.2 Instruc-
tively, southern slaveholders also evoked the similarities between
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1 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Of the Rights of Persons, in 1 COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 430 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1979) (1765) (citations omitted).
2 E.g., ANGELINA GRIMKE, Letters to Catherine Beecher, Letter XII, in THE FEMINIST PA-
PERS: FROM ADAM TO DE BEAUVOIR 320-22 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973). For the general
use of the metaphor, see BLANCHE GLASSMAN HERSH, THE SLAVERY OF SEX: FEMINIST-
ABOLITIONISTS IN AMERICA passim (1978).
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family members and slaves, not to protest the subordination of mar-
ried women, but to emphasize the humanity of slavery as a social
relation.3
The conjugal, or nuclear, family of our tradition has always co-
existed uneasily with notions of individual rights and responsibili-
ties, but until recently the heavy hand of what Locke called "the
Customs or Laws of the Countrey"4 obscured the full measure of
the conflict. The issue surfaced during the discussion of married
women's property rights in New York state during the mid-nine-
teenth century. Traditionalists opposed such rights on the ground
that they would inevitably disrupt Blackstone's vision of the partners
to a marriage as embodied in one person-the husband. Advocates
of women's rights supported these rights on the ground that mar-
ried women should indeed be recognized as separate persons-and
be properly equipped to protect themselves against their husbands'
possible abuse or malfeasance. In the event, reform of married wo-
men's property rights primarily resulted from the efforts of a third
group, which sought not to further the independence of women, but
rather to bring greater consistency to the law of property and to
conform that law to the social and economic realities of the develop-
ing capitalist economy.5
The debates over the property rights of married women fore-
shadowed a continuing debate over the rights of women as individu-
als-that is, women's natural rights. Many of those who favored the
persisting subordination of women within families did so because
they favored a view of the family as an island of traditional hierarchy
within a swirling sea of capitalism and individualism. It is, nonethe-
less, instructive to note that many of those who most staunchly sup-
ported the traditional concept of the family came to oppose the
persistence of slavery, which many of them perceived as both a
moral outrage and a fetter on economic development.
The issue might be seen as a difference over the appropriate
composition of families. The emancipation of the slaves effectively
ensured the triumph of a very narrow conception of family and,
however unintentionally, paved the way for the recognition of the
family as little more than a contractual union of free individuals. In-
tuitively, many of us would insist upon the distinction between wives
and children since the former first enter into the union voluntarily
3 For the general use of the metaphor, see ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE
PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 101 (1988).
4 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
§ 82 (Cambridge University Press 1960).
5 NORMA BASCH, IN THE EVES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982).
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whereas the latter are born into it and spend many years in a state of
physical as well as economic dependence. 6 But our own times sadly
reveal that the tensions between the freedom of individuals funda-
mental to the market and the family as a corporate unit also affect
the status of children.
But questions remain. How should we think about the individ-
ual rights and responsibilities of family members? Does the family
legally constitute something more than the sum of its constituent
parts? To insist upon the family as a moral or social unit will not
suffice without a clear-and implicitly corporate-legal status. The
arguments against untoward (however untoward is defined) state in-
terference in family affairs normally assume the existence of an in-
tact family. I do not wish to engage such questions as whether
parents who are Christian Scientists have the right to deny medical
care to a child with leukemia or meningitis. Rather, I wish to raise
the question of whether the arguments apply with equal force in
cases of divorce or other forms of family disintegration. Are there
legal grounds for denying an abused spouse or child recourse
against the abuser? Do we not assume that family members have
rights as individuals? And, if we do, what legal constraints do we
place upon their independent relation to the polity and the market?
The point at issue is whether family members are held account-
able for behaving towards other family members as they would be
obligated to behave toward any other individual or whether they are
held accountable for behaving in certain ways toward other family
members because of their special status as family members. Gener-
ally, this question has been framed as an inquiry into the power of
fathers over other family members. Since the nineteenth century,
and at an accelerating rate during the twentieth, the extreme forms
of paternal power have come under increasing criticism and legal
restriction. But the dismantling of that power has not led to new
conceptions of the family as a corporate unit. Thus, the conception
of the family as a group of individuals has followed naturally from
the rejection of the view that the family's corporate identity was in-
vested in the powers of its head. Tellingly, this rejection has also
led to arguments that the concept and legal prerogatives of family
relations should be extended to different groupings of individuals.
Until very recently, most people would have considered marital
rape a contradiction in terms. If there is marriage, then there can-
not be rape-although there may be an unacceptably violent exer-
cise of marital rights. Today, many people assume that individual
rights override marital rights-that behavior that is unacceptable if
6 For an insightful discussion positing that individual rights for children are
..wrong rights," see ELIZABETH WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 28-38 (1987).
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two people are not married is also unacceptable if they are married.
The same could be said of child abuse. American society has always
attributed some rights to members of families. Unlike early Roman
society, we have never given fathers the right to kill their offspring
with impunity. Even slaveholders were not legally allowed to kill
their slaves on a whim.7 But we have, at law, and especially in senti-
ment, granted special rights to the heads of households or families
on the premise that their responsibility for family well-being entitled
them to broad discretion in the exercise of their authority.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the discussion of the
family from the discussion of marriage. The movement for women's
political and economic equality with men has primarily targeted wo-
men's traditional subordination within the family. In attempting to
free women from that subordination, supporters of women's rights,
have, however inadvertently, contributed the destruction of the last
vestiges of the family's corporate status. But opponents of women's
rights and defenders of the family have failed no less woefully by not
providing a new conception of the family as a corporate unit. Thus,
discussions of women's and children's rights as members of family
units invariably focus on what Elizabeth Wolgast has called "wrong
rights"-their rights as autonomous individuals.8 I would argue
that a revitalized view of the family requires a new conception of its
corporate identity. Such a conception must simultaneously allow
for women's full participation as parents and for both parents' bind-
ing economic responsibility to their children.
If we are to defend the rights of families as units, then perhaps
we should begin by endowing them with some greater measure of
permanence and a more binding mutual responsibility than that
granted by a normal contract. Perhaps parents should be denied the
right to divorce until their children have attained their majority or
are economically self-sufficient. In the case of intolerable unhappi-
ness, a husband and wife could separate but would not be allowed to
remarry or to assume economic responsibility for another family.
In pre-Revolutionary France such a separation was known as the
separation of bed and board.
To be sure the enforcement of a married couple's binding eco-
nomic responsibilities to each other and their children would re-
quire the cooperation of the federal government, but that is another
debate. For the moment, permit me to conclude by reasserting that
any serious discussion of families and individual responsibilities
7 On the law of slavery, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981) and EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
8 See supra note 6, at 28-38.
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must begin with attention to the legal status of the family as an insti-
tution. A simple return to fathers of their historical power as heads
of families will not suffice.
